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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Antitrust LaW-INSURANCE-POLICYHOLDERS MAY MAINTAIN SHER-
MAN ACT ANTITRUST SUIT AGAINST INSURER UNDER BoycoTr Ex-
CEPTION OF MCCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT
Bar., v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,
555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (Nov. 1, 1977) (No. 77-240).
The McCarran-Ferguson Act' confers upon the "business of
insurance''2 a broad exemption from federal antitrust laws.3 Under
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Mar. 9, 1945, Pub. L. No.
79-15, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33).
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence
on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the several States....
[Section 2.]
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be
subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation
of such business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insur-
ance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifi-
cally relates to the business of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, the
Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the Sherman Act, and the Act of
October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the Clayton Act, and the Act of Sep-
tember 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, shall
be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not
regulated by State law. ...
[Section 3.]
(a) Until June 30, 1948, the Act of July 2, 1890, as amended, known as the
Sherman Act, and the Act of October 15, 1914, as amended, known as the
Clayton Act, and the Act of September 26, 1914, known as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, and the Act of June 19, 1936, known as the Robinson-Patman
Anti-Discrimination Act, shall not apply to the business of insurance or to acts in
the conduct thereof.
(b) Nothing contained in this [Act] shall render the said Sherman Act inappli-
cable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coer-
cion, or intimidation.
Id. §§ 1011-1013. [Hereinafter section numbers refer to those of the Act.]
2 The Supreme Court has construed "business of insurance" to mean the range of
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section 3 (b) of the Act, however, "any agreement to boycott, coerce,
or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion, or intimidation"4 remains
subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act. 5
In recent years, courts have advanced the proposition that
Congress never intended section 3(b) to authorize suits by policy-
holders against their insurers.6 The First Circuit, in Barry v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,7 rejected that rule. The Barry de-
cision suggests an expanded federal role in the regulation of insur-
ance contracts.
activities that grow out of or surround the relationship between policyholders and their
insurers. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969). National Securities held that
an Arizona law aimed at protecting the interests of insurance companies' stockholders was
not enacted for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance under § 2 of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. For discussions of the fate of "business of insurance" since Na-
tional Securities, see 'Note, Federal Regulation of Insurance Companies: The Disappearing McCar-
ran Act Exemption, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1340; Comment, The McCarran Act's Antitrust Exemption
for "the Business of Insurance": A Shrinking Umbrella, 43 TENN. L. REV. 329 (1976); Note, The
McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time for Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271 (1976).
3 The Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act are
applicable to the business of insurance only "to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State law." McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(b). Courts have been very liberal in finding
state regulation. For a discussion of this tendency, see Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co.,
518 F.2d 217, 224-27 (5th Cir. 1975) (dissenting opinion, Gobold, J.). Only where the
insurance companies' conduct involves significant multistate activity have courts found a
lack of state regulation. See FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 297-99 (1960)
(state regulation of insurer's interstate activities inadequate to preempt FTC jurisdiction);
Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729, 738-39 (8th Cir. 1977) (greater connec-
tion to state than residence required for state regulation to preempt federal antitrust laws).
See generally Note, The Limits of State Regulation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act: Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross of Western Pennsylvania, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 427, 434-44
(1974).
" McCarran-Ferguson Act § 3(b) is commonly known as the "boycott exception" or the
"boycott provision," and will be referred to as such throughout this Note.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
'E.g., Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725
(9th Cir. 1974) (challenge to loan-insurance tie-in), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Pastor
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., [1976-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,783 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (challenge
to change in professional liability coverage); Pierucci v. Continental Cas. Co., 418 F. Supp.
704 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (challenge to change in professional liability coverage); Mathis v. Au-
tomobile Club Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (challenge to member-
ship requirement); Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Tex. 1974),
aff'd, 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975) (challenge to risk classification scheme).
This proposition bars policyholder antitrust actions. Since the insurer-insured relation-
ship is the core of "business of insurance" (see note 2 supra), and since courts are quick to
find state regulation (see note 3 supra), policyholders can avoid the McCarran-Ferguson
Act's antitrust exemption only through the boycott exception.
' 555 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (Nov. 1, 1977) (No.
77-240).
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I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Act: A Hasty Compromise
In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association8 the
Supreme Court held, for the first time, that the business of insur-
ance was subject to federal antitrust laws. 9 Congress responded
swiftly to that decision by passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act.1"
The original bill,11 introduced by Senators McCarran and Fergu-
son, clearly supported state control over insurance matters but was
ambiguous as to the role of federal antitrust statutes. Under the
bill's exemption provision,
[n]o act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or
tax upon such business, unless such act specifically so provides.12
Another provision gave the insurance industry a two-year mor-
atorium from antitrust liability except for "any agreement' or act of
boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 1 3 The exemption provision in-
dicated that the antitrust laws were to bow to state insurance regu-
8 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
9 For 75 years the Supreme Court maintained that insurance was not commerce. See,
e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
183 (1869). Without authority under the commerce clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3)
Congress could not regulate insurance transactions. Id. amend. X. Consequently the busi-
ness of insurance enjoyed immunity from federal antitrust statutes. That immunity ended
abruptly in 1944. The South-Eastern Underwriters decision sustained an indictment of the
Association and nearly 200 member insurance companies for violations of the Sherman
Act. The conspirators had fixed premium rates and agents' commissions. They had also
blacklisted competitors and boycotted consumers who bought from non-Association mem-
bers. 322 U.S. at 535-36.
10 Congress was under considerable pressure to pass legislation quickly. South-Eastern
Undemnwiters not only exposed the entire insurance industry to enormous antitrust liability
but also cast doubt upon the continued validity of state regulation and taxation of insur-
ance. Many insurance companies announced they would not pay state taxes until these
constitutional issues were resolved. 91 CONG. Rc. 484 (remarks of Senator Ferguson), 979
(remarks of Rep. Anderson), 1093 (remarks of Rep. Sumners) (1945). See also 90 CONG.
Rac. 6548 (1944) (remarks of Rep. Cravens).
11 S. 340, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. Rc. 478 (1945). The bill was a modification
of one drafted by the legislative committee of the National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners. Id. at 483 (remarks of Senator O'Mahoney), 1488 (remarks of Senator Barkley).
12 S. 340 § 2(b), 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. Rc. 478 (1945).
1"Id. § 4(b), 91 CONG. REC. at 478.
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lations. But the moratorium provision, with its boycott exception,
suggested a strong federal interest in breaking up restraints of
trade within the insurance industry. 14
The Senate and the House lined up on opposite sides of the
controversy. 15 The Senate bill made the Sherman Act'6 and the
Clayton Act 17 fully applicable to the insurance business.'" The
House bill made the antitrust statutes effective only in the absence
of conflicting state insurance laws.' 9 Under tremendous pressure to
enact legislation,2 ° the two houses essentially split their differences.
As enacted, section 2(b) made the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act2 ' applicable to the business
of insurance, but only "to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State law."'22 This section, an apparent victory for the
House, was limited by an expansion of the boycott exception.
Whereas the exception had previously affected only the two-year
moratorium,23 it now modified the entire Act.2 4 As a result, the
phrase "boycott, coerce, or intimidate" became important to the
meaning of the Act as a whole: if interpreted broadly, the Senate
view would prevail; if interpreted narrowly, the House view would
prevail. Congress enacted the bill without further clarification. 5
14 Senator Ferguson, co-sponsor of the bill, evidently believed that § 2(b) did not allow
states to negate the federal antitrust laws. 91 CONG. REC. at 479. He admitted, however, that
the bill was ambiguous and proposed an amendment excluding the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act from the operation of § 2(b). Id. at 486. The Senate passed the amendment.
Id. at 488. See note 18 infra. The House later rejected the amendment, and it did not
appear in the conference bill. See notes 19-22 and accompanying text infra.
'5 In the previous session of Congress, the House passed a bill exempting insurance
companies from federal antitrust liability. H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 CONG. REc.
6565 (1944). The bill died in the Senate. Id. at 8054.
16 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
1" The Senate amended § 2(b) to read: "No act of Congress, except [the Sherman Act]
and/or [the Clayton Act], shall be construed ...." 91 CONG. REc. at 488.
19 The House explicitly rejected the Senate's view on the proper scope of the federal
antitrust laws, re-amending § 2(b) to read: "No act of Congress shall be construed .... Id.
at 1085, 1093.
20 See note 10 supra.
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
22 McCarran-Ferguson Act § 2(b).
23 91 CONG. REc. at 488, 1085. Before the bill went into conference, the exception was
not very significant. In the Senate version, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act would
take full effect upon expiration of the moratorium. In the House version, the states could
enact laws to preempt even the boycott exception.
24 McCarran-Ferguson Act § 3(b).
25 See 91 CONG. REc. at 1542, 1595.
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B. Judicial Construction of Section 3(b): The Meicler Rule
For nearly thirty years following passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, courts generally assumed that the boycott exception
would reach any boycott illegal under the Sherman Act.2 6 Only
Transnational Insurance Co. v. Rosenlund2 7 suggested otherwise: "The
legislative history shows that the boycott, coercion and intimidation
exception, [sic] was placed in the legislation to protect insurance
agents from the issuance by insurance companies of a 'black-list,'
which would name companies or agents which were beyond the
pale."28
In 1974, Meicler v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.2 9 adopted
Transnational's blacklist analysis to dismiss a policyholder antitrust
action. The Meiclers charged Texas automobile liability insurers
with collusion in setting risk classifications30 and claimed a right of
action under the boycott exception.3 1 Although admitting that the
26 See Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 846 (2d
Cir. 1963) (dictum), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964); Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples v.
San Juan, 294 F. Supp. 627, 628 (D.P.R. 1968); Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co.
v. Banker's Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274, 281-83 (D. Mont. 1958). These three cases involved
disputes between insurance companies. Prior to 1969, persons outside the industry rarely
brought antitrust actions against insurers. The Supreme Court's decision in SEC v. Na-
tional Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), opened insurance companies to liability for anticom-
petitive activity not falling within the "business of insurance." Accord, Hill v. National Auto
Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (action by auto repair shop charging insurers
with conspiracy to direct policyholders' business to particular shops). See note 2 supra. The
years following National Securities saw an increasing number of challenges to insurance in-
dustry rate fixing, tie-ins, and other practices. See, e.g., Battle v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
493 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974) (funeral services and merchandise tied to burial insurance),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1110 (1975); Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178
(6th Cir. 1971) (rate fixing), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 917 (1972); Schwartz v. Commonwealth
Land Title Ins. Co., 374 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (fixing of fees charged at real estate
closings); Fleming v. Travelers Indem. Co., 324 F. Supp. 1404 (D. Mass. 1971) (rate
fixing).
27 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Ore. 1966).
2 Id. at 26 (dictum) (emphasis in original). The court dismissed plaintiff's complaint
on the ground that it failed to allege a boycott.
Entirely aside from the legislative history of the Act, and assuming that the
exception is applicable to the arena in which we are working, there is absolutely
nothing in this record which would indicate a boycott, coercion or intimidation.
... The word "boycott," as used in this type of legislation, implies an urging or an
agreement with another person to desist from doing business with another. The
word does not apply to cases where persons are urged to do business with another.
Id. at 27.
'9 372 F. Supp. 509 (S.D. Tex. 1974), affd, 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975).
20 The Meicler's automobile liability insurer had put them in a higher risk class. After
the reclassification, no other insurer would sell the Meiclers insurance at a lower rate.
31 Only one reported decision prior to Meicler dealt with a boycott claim raised by
policyholders under McCarran-Ferguson Act § 3(b). See Steingart v. Equitable Life Assur-
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terms "boycott and coercion, as commonly defined, might be con-
strued to encompass [the plaintiffs' allegations], 32 the district court
dismissed the complaint. The court cited Transnational and con-
cluded that section 3(b) was intended to cover a "rather narrow
area of activity bearing no resemblance to the situation described in
Plaintiffs' Complaint. ' 33 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed: "Appellants' broad construction of Section [3(b)] would
emasculate the antitrust exemption contained in Section [2(b)] of
the McCarran-Ferguson Act."
'3 4
In rapid succession, policyholder complaints were dismissed by




BARRY V. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE Co.
In January 1975, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. an-
nounced a change in its medical malpractice coverage. 39 The com-
ance Soc'y of the United States, 366 F. Supp. 790, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (boycott claim
characterized by court as "last ditch effort to revive an otherwise moribund complaint").
32 372 F. Supp. at 513.
33 Id.
31 506 F.2d at 734.
35 Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725 (9th
Cir. 1974) (challenge to loan tie-in), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
36 Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 527 F.2d 233 (2d Cir.
1975) (challenge to loan tie-in).
37 Crawford v. American Title Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1975) (challenge to title
insurance rate fixing).
38 Pierucci v. Continental Cas. Co., 418 F. Supp. 704 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (challenge to
professional liability insurance scheme); McIlhenny v. American Title Ins. Co., 418 F.
Supp. 364 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (challenge to title insurance tie-in); Mathis v. Automobile Club
Inter-Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (challenge to membership require-
ment); Pastor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., [1976-1] TRAD GAS. (CCH), 60,783 (C.D. Cal.
1976) (challenge to professional liability insurance scheme). In four other cases district
courts adopted a narrow reading of § 3(b) in dismissing boycott complaints by non-policy-
holders. See Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (hospital),
affd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3218 (Oct. 3, 1977)
(No. 77-171); Royal Drug v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex.
1976) (pharmacists), rev'd on other grounds, 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977); Seasongood v. K
& K Ins. Agency, 414 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (insurance agent), rev'd on other
grounds, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977); Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F.
Supp. 27 (D.D.C. 1975) (auto repair shops), rev'd in pertinent part, 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir.
1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580). But see Ballard
v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1976) (chiropractor complaint
challenging health insurance plan held to allege boycott under McCarran-Ferguson Act
§ 3(b); line of cases giving § 3(b) narrow reading not mentioned), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922
(1977).
39 N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1975, at 34, col. 1.
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pany discontinued its "occurrence" type of policy; in the future it
would offer only "claims made" insurance.40 In June, physicians
brought a $100 million antitrust action challenging the change in
coverage. 41 The class action 42 accused St. Paul and three other
insurance companies 43 of "conspiring to shrink the malpractice
coverage available to Rhode Island doctors. '44 According to the
complaint, doctors who objected to St. Paul's innovation and tried
to switch carriers found that none of the other companies would
sell them policies of any kind.45 Plaintiffs believed the refusals evi-
denced an unlawful agreement in restraint of trade.46
The district court 47 dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on the
ground that policyholders have no right of action under section
3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 48 In a dramatic departure
from a "rather formidable array of authorities, ' 49 the First Cir-
cuit reversed the dismissal and remanded to the district court.50
Chief Judge Coffin's majority opinion 5' characterized the issue as
"whether a 'consumer' of insurance can sue an insurance company
for violating the antitrust laws."5 2
Judge Coffin blasted Meicler for venturing beyond the lan-
guage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 53 claiming that the words
"boycott, coerce, or intimidate" are unambiguous in the context of
40 A one-year "occurrence" policy would protect a doctor from future liability for any
act committed during that year. A one-year "claims made" policy would protect a doctor
from future liability on claims filed during that year. Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 555 F.2d at 5.
41 N.Y. Times, June 5, 1975, at 29, col. 1. Plaintiffs also requested injunctive relief. 555
F.2d at 5.
42 Plaintiffs filed the action in the District of Rhode Island, and sought to represent all
licensed physicians practicing in Rhode Island and all citizens of Rhode Island who were or
were to come under a doctor's care. 555 F.2d at 5.
43 The other insurance companies named were Aetna, Hartford, and Travelers. N.Y.
Times, supra note 41, at 29, col. 1.





47 The opinion is unreported.
48 555 F.2d at 6. The district court relied on Meicler, Transnational, and Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 929 (1975).
49 555 F.2d at 7.
50 1d. at 12.
51 Judge Coffin was joined by Judge Gignoux, sitting by designation. Judge Campbell
dissented.
52 555 F.2d at 5.
23 "We would be justified in probing legislative history if the language were ambiguous
or if, even though unambiguous, the language literally read produced a senseless or un-
workable statute." Id. at 7.
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federal antitrust law.54 The Chief Judge denied that a literal read-
ing of section 3 (b) vitiates the Sherman Act exemption in section
2(b),55 because not every practice condemned by the Sherman Act
constitutes a boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 56 Nor does a literal
interpretation shackle state regulatory authority-the state-action
doctrine of Parker v. Brown57 still insulates legitimate state regula-
tory schemes.58
54 Id. Judge Coffin stated: "In antitrust law, a boycott is a 'concerted refusal to deal'
with a disfavored purchaser or seller. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207
... (1959)." Id. As Judge Campbell pointed out in dissent (id. at 14 n.2), the Klor's defini-
tion is "concerted refusal by traders to deal with other traders" and makes no mention of
traders' refusals to deal with consumers. See 359 U.S. at 212. Judge Coffin responded in a
footnote that "[tihe Ninth Circuit has held that a boycott of customers is a boycott for
antitrust purposes. Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d
371, 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 ... (1966)." 555 F.2d at 7 n.4. However, even
Washington State involved an action by a trader, not a consumer. Judge Coffin acknowl-
edged the paucity of cases dealing with boycotts directed at consumers. He suggested that
such boycotts are rare because "a large class of victims cannot easily be coerced without
destroying the secrecy on which illegal boycotts often depend." Id.
'5 Contra, Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725,
729 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
" Judge Coffin suggested that predatory pricing or the use of benign means to main-
tain a monopoly does not involve boycott, coercion, or intimidation. 555 F.2d at 8.
5 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, the Court stated: "We find nothing in the language
of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a state
or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." Id. at 350-51. From this
observation grew the doctrine that legitimate and affirmative state involvement insulates an
activity from liability under the Sherman Act. Many commentators have criticized the
Parker doctrine. See Handler, The Current Attack on the Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1976). The Supreme Court has recently narrowed the scope of
the Parker exemption. See Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
According to Bates, private conduct receives protection under Parker if state law requires
such conduct, the state has a substantial interest in the particular conduct, and approval of
the conduct takes the form of a visible, reviewable articulation of state policy. 97 S. Ct. at
2696-98. Bates supports Judge Coffin's view that Parker would insulate state-sanctioned rate
setting. See 555 F.2d at 8-9. State regulation probably would exempt insurance companies
from the Sherman Act, particularly regarding anticompetitive conduct identified by Na-
tional Securities as the core of the business of insurance---'[t]he relationship between insurer
and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and
enforcement" (393 U.S. at 460). States have traditionally had a substantial interest in these
areas. But even here the breadth of the Parker umbrella will vary with the amount of
freedom the regulatory scheme allows insurers and with the degree of insurance-company
involvement in the promulgation of the regulations.
5
8 Judge Coffin wrote, "[rlegulation by the state would be protected; concerted
boycotts against groups of consumers not resting on state authority would have no immu-
nity." 555 F.2d at 9.
Judge Coffin's broad reading of § 2(b) also comports with the judicial trend to narrow
antitrust exemptions. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (state-action
exemption); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (learned-profession
exemption); United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 348 U.S. 236
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Judge Coffin also found two points fatal to Meicler's reading of
the legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. First, both
houses of Congress debated extensively the scope of the boycott
provision:
It was amended twice, in each case to make it broader, first by
making it effective across the entire Act and second by restoring
the agreement language. Time after time the concerns of skep-
tics and opponents were met by reference to this provision. We
cannot imagine that they would have been at all satisfied if they
had understood that "boycott" was a code word confined to in-
dustry personnel.5 9
Second, throughout the debates congressmen mentioned industry
blacklisting practices only twice. 60 The court concluded that neither
the words of the statute nor its legislative history precludes policy-
holder suits. 61
III
THE CONTOURS OF THE BOYCOTT EXCEPTION
In rejecting Meicler, the First Circuit stands on solid ground.62
The rule barring antitrust actions by policyholders draws an artifi-
(1955) (refusing to extend baseball exemption to boxing); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951) (Miller-Tydings fair-trade exemption).
59 555 F.2d at 12. Judge Coffin claimed that the Senate expanded the boycott excep-
tion to cover the entire Act. Id. at 10. He is not accurate. Senator Murdock suggested such
an amendment (91 CONG. REc. 479 (1945)), but the Senate rejected it in favor of an
amendment offered by Senator Ferguson making the Sherman and Clayton Acts fully
applicable to the business of insurance. Id. at 488. See note 18 and accompanying text
supra. Not until the bill emerged from conference did the boycott exception apply to the
entire Act. See notes 11-22 and accompanying text supra.
60 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (Rep. Celler), 1480 (Senator O'Mahoney) (1945).
61 "We simply do not find in these debates or reports any evidence that would justify
our reading the boycott provision in the special way urged by appellees .... We therefore
reverse the lower court on this issue." 555 F.2d at 12.
62 Other courts have criticized Meicler. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
561 F.2d 262, 272-74 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Meider rests on paltry legislative analysis; boycott
exception covers restraints of trade including element of coercive enforcement), petition for
cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross,
417 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (dictum) (§ 3(b) can reach "practices which
have the same purpose and effect as blacklisting or which are equally pernicious in violat-
ing the most fundamental notions of competition and fair play"), affd per curiam, 554 F.2d
1253 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3218 (Oct. 3, 1977) (No. 77-171). In 1976, the
Fourth Circuit ignored Meicler and held that "boycott" in the Act means the same as it does
in antitrust law generally. Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1078
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977). See also Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal
Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 846 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum) (section 3(b) reaches all
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cial line between sections 2(b) and 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.63 The boycott exception addresses conduct; nothing in the
provision suggests that antitrust liability hinges on the status of the
plaintiff.64 Whether the victim is a customer who was denied insur-
ance or an agent who was denied a sale should not affect section
3(b) liability.65 Nor does the legislative history support the distinc-
tion between policyholder suits and non-policyholder suits. 66 De-
boycotts or agreements to boycott illegal under Sherman Act), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952
(1964); Professional Adjusting Sys. of America, Inc. v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc.,
64 F.R.D. 35, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (same).
Other courts, while not criticizing Meicler, have limited its effect. Three district court
cases applying Meic/er in order to dismiss antitrust actions have been reversed on other
grounds. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977)
(alleged conduct did not fall within business of insurance), rev'g 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D.
Tex. 1976); Zelson v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 549 F.2d 62 (8th Cir. 1977) (complaint
did not establish activities as business of insurance), rev'g 410 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Mo.
1976); Seasongood v. K & K Ins. Agency, 548 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1977) (complaint did not
establish that activities regulated by state law), rev'g 414 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mo. 1976). By
narrowly construing the phrases "business of insurance" and "regulated by state law," these
courts circumvented the boycott issue.
'3 As the legislative history makes clear, §§ 2(b) and 3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act embody respectively the desire to leave insurance regulation to the states and the de-
sire to protect the federal interest in competitive markets. See notes 9-25 and accompanying
text supra. Because the two provisions conflict, defining the contours of the boycott excep-
tion will determine the limits of the antitrust exemption. Meicler recognized the tension
between the two sections: "Appellants' broad construction of Section [3(b)] would emascu-
late the antitrust exemption contained in Section [2(b)] .... 506 F.2d at 734. The Fifth
Circuit attempted to solve the problem by limiting the types of parties who could invoke
the boycott exception, rather than by specifying the substantive content of the words
"boycott, coerce, or intimidate."
64 See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petition
for cert.filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580).
Certainly there is no hint in the plain language of the [boycott exception] that only
acts and agreements directed against insurance companies or agents were to be
subject to the exception. And our examination of the legislative history of the
provision, and the target at which it was aimed, convinces us that no such limita-
tion was intended.
Id. at 272. In Proctor, auto repair shopowners sued five insurance companies for price-
fixing and group boycotts. The insurers had agreed to use a "prevailing labor rate" in
paying damage claims. They implemented the agreement by informing customers of cer-
tain "preferred" shops which would charge the "prevailing rate." The D.C. Circuit held
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar the shopowners' boycott claim, but affirmed a
district court grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the merits. Id. at 274-76.
65 Standing presents an entirely different question. Whether a customer has standing
to sue under the Sherman Act becomes an issue only after he gets past the McCarran-
Ferguson Act. See Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 14 n.2 (dissenting
opinion, Campbell, J.) (broad reading of boycott exception does not solve question of plain-
tiffs' standing).
6 One possible justification for the Meicler rule is that a reading broad enough to
permit policyholder suits conflicts with National Securities, because Congress intended to
leave the insurer-insured relationship to state, not federal, regulation. Meicler v. Aetna
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spite Meicler's insistence that Congress aimed the boycott exception
at industry blacklisting practices,67 the debates in the House and
Senate reveal no such narrow focus. 68
Recognizing the boycott exception as something more than an
anti-blacklisting provision raises sensitive issues as to its proper
scope. As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals re-
cently noted, "the terms of the [boycott] provision are not self-
defining, and are capable of being read in such a way as to swallow
the antitrust exemption. ' 69 Congress certainly intended to give the
insurance industry some relief from federal antitrust liability. Un-
like the Senate bill, which would have made the Sherman Act and
the Clayton Act fully applicable to the business of insurance,7 0 the
final version of the McCarran-Ferguson Act exposes insurance
companies to liability only under the Sherman Act 7' and only for
acts or agreements to boycott, coerce, or intimidate. To give the
words "boycott, coerce, or intimidate" their broadest possible read-
ing would largely negate this change in the statute.7 2
Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d at 735; Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United
States, 503 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975). This argument
confuses the boycott issue with the "business of insurance" issue. As National Securities
makes clear, the McCarran-Ferguson Act applies only to the business of insurance; conduct
outside the scope of "business of insurance" will not benefit from § 2(b) exemptions. Con-
sequeiftly, not even state statutes that regulate or protect the insurer-insured relationship
will preempt the Sherman Act as to "boycott, coercion, or intimidation."
"
7 See Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d at 734. See also Addrisi v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725, 728-29 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 929 (1975). The blacklist analysis first appeared in Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosen-
lund, 261 F. Supp. 12, 26-27 (D. Ore. 1966). See note 28 and accompanying text supra. In
support of its thesis, the Transnational court cited only a single page of the Congressional
Record. See 261 F. Supp. at 27 n.1.
6 See Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 12 ("While the vice of
insurance company self-government outside the law obviously lay in their minds as a major
evil to be combatted by the legislation, there is no suggestion that the legislation was lim-
ited to that evil."); note 75 and accompanying text infra.
69 Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580). See Addrisi v. Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 503 F.2d 725, 729 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1110 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), affid per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3218
(Oct. 3, 1977) (No. 77-171); Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp. at 513. But see
Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 7 (words "boycott, coercion, or
intimidation" not ambiguous).
7 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
71 The McCarran-Ferguson Act does, however, permit recovery of treble damages,
even though this remedy is technically part of the Clayton Act. Monarch Life Ins. Co. v.
Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d 841, 845-46 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
952 (1964).
7 Insurance companies would still be protected from the Clayton Act, since the
boycott exception relates only to the Sherman Act.
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Although the boycott exception is susceptible to a wide range
of interpretations, the legislative history suggests upper and lower
bounds to the scope of the provision. At the very least, Congress
intended the McCarran-Ferguson Act to protect rate setting by
state regulatory bodies. Shortly before its enactment, Senator Fer-
guson said of the bill: "[It] would permit-and I think it is fair to
say that it is intended to permit-rating bureaus. . . . I think the
insurance companies have convinced many members of the legis-
lature that we cannot have open competition in fixing rates on in-
surance." 73 Price, however, is only one term in an insurance con-
tract; states could also approve the standardization of other terms,
such as types of coverage, limits of the policy, and conditions of eli-
gibility.
On the other hand, Congress clearly did not intend to insulate
from antitrust attack purely private decisionmaking by insurance
company cartels. This was the evil addressed in South-Eastern Un-
derwriters:
The conspirators . . . employed boycotts together with other
types of coercion and intimidation to force non-member insur-
ance companies into the conspiracies, and to compel persons who
needed insurance to buy only from S. E. U. A. [the association]
members on S. E. U. A. terms. Companies not members of
S. E. U. A. were cut off from the opportunity to reinsure their
risks, and their services and facilities were disparaged; indepen-
dent sales agencies who defiantly represented non-S. E. U. A.
companies were punished by a withdrawal of the right to repre-
sent the members of S. E. U. A.; and persons needing insurance
who purchased from non-S. E. U. A. companies were threatened
with boycotts and withdrawal of all patronage. 74
Congress undoubtedly extracted the language of the boycott excep-
tion from this description of the indictment in South-Eastern Under-
writers, and therefore intended the boycott exception to reach such
conduct and agreements.7 5
73 91 CONG. REC. 1481 (1945).
74 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 535-36 (describing
indictment).
75 See id. at 562 ("No states authorize combinations of insurance companies to coerce,
intimidate, and boycott competitors and consumers in the manner here alleged. ... );
Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 273-74 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580); Barry v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 11; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE PRICING AND
MARKETING OF INSURANCE 20 (1977). The indictment covered more than blacklisting-it
also accused the defendants of threatening to boycott policyholders. As the Proctor court
said, "[w]e find it hard to believe that Congress would have intended a construction of the
1978]
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But the Barry court used this legislative history to discredit the
Meicler rule, not to refine the meaning of the boycott exception.
For the latter task, Barry looks to section 3(b) itself and finds its
terms unambiguous within the context of the Sherman Act. 76 In
upholding the plaintiff doctors' right of action, the court defined
"boycott" simply as "a 'concerted refusal to deal' with a disfavored
purchaser or seller. '77
Despite Judge Coffin's "plain meaning" analysis, the term
"boycott," as used in the Sherman Act, is anything but unambigu-
ous. 78 Boycotts involve concerted refusals to deal79 and, as a gen-
boycott provision which excludes from its sweep activities explicitly addressed in the case
from which its language is drawn." 561 F.2d at 274. See Note, supra note 3, at 445.
Meicler did not involve such grossly anticompetitive activities. The Meiclers had pur-
chased automobile liability insurance at a particular rate. Upon expiration of the policy, the
Meiclers' insurer informed them that they had been placed in a more expensive risk class,
evidently as a result of a driving accident. Following the reclassification, no other Texas
insurance company would sell the Meiclers insurance at the previous rate. The district
court found that the defendants had acted pursuant to a risk classification scheme adopted
by the State Insurance Board. 372 F. Supp. at 510-12.
State regulatory plans of this type perform a rate-setting function and are no more
objectionable than other arrangements falling within the antitrust exemption of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. See text accompanying note 73 supra. Thus the rule barring all
policyholder actions under the boycott exception was unnecessary to the result in Meicler.
Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petition
for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580).
7
' See note 54 and accompanying text supra. Several courts disagree. See, e.g., Proctor v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46
U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp.
1104, 1110 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3218 (Oct. 3, 1977) (No. 77-171); Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 372 F. Supp.
at 513.
77 555 F.2d at 7 (quoting Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959)).
78 In State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 A. 890 (1887), the first American case to use the
word, the court remarked that "[boycotting] is not easily defined." Id. at 76, 8 A. at 896.
Subsequent judicial use of the word supports that observation. Compare Smythe Neon Sign
Co. v. Local 405, 226 Iowa 191, 197, 284 N.W. 126, 130 (1939) (intimidation and coercion
necessary elements of boycott), and Walsh v. Association of Master Plumbers, 97 Mo. App.
280, 292, 71 S.W. 455, 459 (1902) (boycott defined as illegal conspiracy in restraint of
trade), with Butterick Pub. Co. v. Typographical Union No. 6, 50 Misc. 1, 10, 100 N.Y.S.
292, 298 (Sup. Ct. 1906) (boycott does not necessarily involve violence, intimidation, or
other unlawful coercive means), and Denver Local 13 v. Perry Truck Lines, Inc., 106 Colo.
25, 42-46, 101 P.2d 436, 444-46 (1940) (boycott not necessarily illegal).
79 Loosely defined, "boycott" can include even individual refusals to deal. See
Paramount Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, 104 Fla. 407, 412, 140 So. 328, 330 (1932) (boycott
includes "a mere withdrawal of business by an individual"). Individual refusals to deal do
not violate the Sherman Act, unless they involve monopolization or attempts to monop-
olize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975). See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953). Concerted refusals to deal, on the other hand, run afoul of the
prohibition against contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 15
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eral rule, are per se restraints of trade.8 0 But not all concerted
refusals to deal are illegal, particularly where there is no purpose to
coerce trade policy or to remove competition.81 As a result, courts
have used the word in two different senses. The first sense restricts
"boycott" to refusals to deal that are per se illegal by requiring some
demonstration of anticompetitive purpose.8 2 The second takes the
U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. at
625. Perhaps to make this distinction between individual and collective actions, the Su-
preme Court in Times-Picayune described concerted refusals to deal as "group boycotts." Id.
This terminology appeared again in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958), and in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). Since
then, courts have generally preferred "group boycott" to "boycott" when discussing con-
certed refusals to deal. But see, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 216 F. Supp.
362, 364 (S.D. Cal. 1963) ("A boycott is a per se violation of the antitrust laws for which
there can be no justification. It consists of a 'concerted refusal to deal.' ").
80 Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns contracts, combinations, or conspiracies that
restrain trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). Courts have taken two basic approaches in
applying § 1. The "rule of reason" approach prohibits concerted conduct that in purpose
or effect significantly restricts competition. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106, 179-80 (1911). Under the "per se" doctrine, certain agreements or practices are pre-
sumed unreasonable, and therefore illegal, because they have such a "pernicious effect on
competition." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Per se analysis avoids
an extended inquiry into commercial reasonableness of the activity and its effect on the
market.
The rule that boycotts are per se illegal developed gradually. See generally L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 84 (1977). In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), the Supreme Court wrote: "Group boycotts, or concerted refus-
als by traders to deal with other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden
category. They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific
circumstances, nor by a failure to show that they [significantly hindered competition]." Id.
at 212 (footnote omitted). Courts have, however, applied the per se doctrine flexibly to cases
involving refusals to deal:
[The rule that group boycotts are per se illegal] seems sensible if [it refers] to true
boycotts: concerted refusals to deal undertaken for the purpose of coercing the
object of the boycott to accede to the action or inaction desired by the group or
with the purpose or effect of excluding a competitor of a group member from
competition. On the other hand, there is a growing awareness in the lower courts
that many so-called "refusal to deal" cases are not boycotts at all, but are simply
the inevitable result of legitimate business decisions.
Media Networks, Inc. v. A.T. & T. Co., [1976-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 60,780, at 68,383-84
(D. Minn. 1976).
81 See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 847,
876-77 (1955) ("When the element of purpose to coerce the trade policy of third parties or
to secure their removal from competition is absent, the policy question raised by agree-
ments under which the parties mutually limit their own freedom to deal with outsiders
becomes more difficult, and the courts have appropriately outlined wider limits before
declaring such agreements illegal."); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 80, § 90. See, e.g., Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969) (re-
fusal by liquor company subsidiaries to deal with former exclusive agent), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1062 (1970); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa Corp., [1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
61,556 (D. Nev. 1977) (concerted refusal by resorts to advertise in newspaper).
"
2 See, e.g., De Filippo v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1313, 1318 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
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broader view that all concerted refusals to deal are boycotts, but
cautions that not all boycotts are illegal.83 For the most part this
difference is semantic, since under either definition only certain
kinds of refusals to deal are per se violations.8 4 In the context of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, the choice of definition deter-
mines section 3(b) liability.
Broadly defined, "boycott" can cover a wide range of pol-
icyholder complaints. As one court observed, "a simple agreement
among insurance companies to charge certain premium rates could
be viewed as a boycott agreement, since its observance would result
in a collective refusal to deal with policyholders except at a fixed
price. '8 5 This result defeats the congressional intention to limit the
antitrust exposure of state-regulated rate agreements. 86 To guard
against such an overextension of the boycott exception, the Barry
court relied on the Parker doctrine, expecting state regulation to
protect most rate-setting schemes from Sherman Act liability. 7 But
even if the Parker doctrine is fit for that task,88 it comes into play
only after the plaintiff has passed the McCarran-Ferguson hurdle.
Thus, the Parker doctrine is powerless to prevent emasculation of
section 2(b) by an unnecessarily broad interpretation of section
3(b).
The boycott exception clearly does not protect the pernicious
activities described in South-Eastern Underwriters, yet falls short of
allowing attacks on state-regulated rate setting.8 9 Its proper scope
lies somewhere in between. To fix the exact locus of section 3(b),
courts should weigh the judicial trend to narrow antitrust exemp-
tions against the long tradition of leaving insurance matters to
state, not federal, regulation." Different courts have struck differ-
ent balances, 91 but the Barry case presents the Supreme Court with
423 U.S. 912 (1975); Media Networks, Inc. v. A.T. & T. Co., [1976-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
60,780, at 68,383-84 (D. Minn. 1976).
83 See, e.g., Sum of Squares, Inc. v. Market Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 53, 56-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Instant Delivery Corp. v. City Stores Co., 284 F. Supp. 941, 947 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
84 However, semantics can become substance if courts confuse one usage of "boycott"
with another. For an argument that boycott should be narrowly defined, see L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 80, §§ 83 & 90, at 231-32, 259.
85 Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580).8 6 See text accompanying note 73 supra.
8 See Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d at 8-9.
8 8 See note 57 supra.
89 See notes 69-75 and accompanying text supra.
90 See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
91 See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262, 274 (D.C. Cir.
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its first opportunity to determine the meaning of the boycott ex-
ception.
92
The Supreme Court should apply the "heavy presumption
against implicit [antitrust] exemptions" 93 to affirm the First Cir-
cuit's holding that consumers have an antitrust right of action
against insurers. Neither statutory language nor legislative history
recommends retention of the Meicler rule. 94 However, Judge Cof-
fin's broad definition of boycott, by relying on the Parker doctrine
to protect state regulation of insurance contracts, nullifies the ef-
fect of section 2(b).95 The Court should endorse instead a narrow
definition of boycott, one which requires plaintiffs to assert some
anticompetitive purpose behind the defendants' refusals to deal. 96
In refining this purpose requirement, courts should draw liberally
upon per se boycott cases.97 Because concerted activities sanctioned
by state regulation are not "anticompetitive" in purpose, they will
not fall within the boycott exception.
CONCLUSION
The First Circuit held in Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co. that policyholders alleging an illegal boycott may maintain
1977) (price-fixing arrangement including some element of enforcement constitutes illegal
boycott), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3294 (Oct. 19, 1977) (No. 77-580); Barry v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 3, 7-12 (1st Cir. 1977) (any concerted refusal to deal
constitutes illegal boycott), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (Nov. 1, 1977) (No. 77-240);
Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1078 (4th Cir. 1976) (§ 3(b) in-
cludes any boycott illegal under Sherman Act); Addrisi v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of
the United States, 503 F.2d 725, 728-29 (9th Cir. 1974) (§ 3(b) includes only blacklisting),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 417 F. Supp. 1104, 1110
n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (§ 3(b) reaches practices violating most fundamental notions of com-
petition and fair play), aff'd per curiam, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3218 (Oct. 3, 1977) (No. 77-171).
92 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (Nov. 1, 1977) (No.
77-240). The Court has construed the McCarran-Ferguson Act five times, but never the
boycott exception. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969) ("business of insur-
ance"); FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293 (1960) ("regulated by state law"); SEC
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65 (1959) ("business of insurance"); FTC v.
National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (§ 2); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946) (§ 2).
9' Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 12 (1976) (quoting
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975)). Statutory exceptions to the anti-
trust laws should be narrowly construed. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n,
Inc., 425 U.S. at 11-12; Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726,
733 (1973); United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305, 316 (1956).
"' See notes 62-75 and accompanying text supra.
9' See text accompanying notes 73, 85-88 supra.
96 See notes 78-84 and accompanying text supra.
97 See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
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a Sherman Act antitrust suit against insurers. In so doing, the First
Circuit raised the important question of the proper scope of the
term "boycott." Having granted certiorari, 98 the Supreme Court
should affirm the rule in Barry allowing "consumers" of insurance
to rely on the McCarran-Ferguson Act's boycott exception. But the
Court must also strike an appropriate balance between the antitrust
exemption in section 2 (b) and the boycott exception in section 3 (b).
To avoid depriving section 2(b) of all utility, the Court should
narrow the First Circuit's definition of boycott by requiring plain-
tiffs under section 3(b) to assert some anticompetitive purpose be-
hind defendants' refusals to deal.
Gregory S. Fryer
98 46 U.S.L.W. 3283 (Nov. 1, 1977) (No. 77-240).
